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WHY LAWYERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
ADVERTISE: A MARKET ANALYSIS
OF LEGAL SERVICES
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. *
RUSSELL G. PEARCE**
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL***
Last August, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Proje ional Conduct.
which significantly altered the ABA' position on lawyer advertising. It is still unclear how the
states will respond to the ABA's new position, and the debate about the propriety of lawyer
advertising continue. In the authors' view, both sides of the debate have overlooked an impur-
tant point: For purposes of analyzing the advertising problem, legal services are of two types,
and the effect of advertising on the legal services market will vary with the type of service
involved. "Individualized" services involve legal matters that pose a significant risk of loss for
clients and require close personal attention from an attorney. For lawyers who provide this type
of service, the authors argue, advertising is of little use since their clients are likely to rely orn
personal knowledge and reputation in selecting an attorney. "Standardizable" services, how-
ever, involve low risk matters and can be provided by means of routinized production systems.
The authors believe that these services can be mass produced at low cost without logs of quality.
They argue that advertising is necessary to generate the mass demand and economics of scale
required to make mass production profitable. The authors conclude that lawyer adt ertLsing will
likely result in more affordable legal services of the standardizable type and in improt ed product
information about these services, thus benefiting low and middle income consumers as well as
the attorneys who specialize in providing standardizable services.
INTRODUCTION
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' a 1977 decision, the United
States Supreme Court overturned the American Bar Association's
(ABA) sixty-nine-year-old prohibition of advertising by lawyers.2 The
* Nathan Baker Professor of Law and Management, Yale University. B.A., 1953,
Swarthmore College; LL.B., 1954, Columbia University. Reporter, ABA Commission on the
Evaluation of Professional Standards. Since writing this Article, Professor Hazard has become a
Board Member of Hyatt Legal Services. The views expressed in this Article do not reflect those of
any commission or organization with which he is affiliated.
Member, New York Bar. B.A., 1978, J.D., 1981, Yale University.
Member, Minnesota Bar. B.A., 1977, University of Minnesota, J.D., 1981, Yale Univer-
sity.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2 The legal clinic of Bates & O'Steen of Phoenix, Arizona, had placed nev spaper advf rtisc-
ments publicizing its offer of legal services at fixed fees and was charged with L iolating Arizona
State Bar standards, 17A Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sup. Ct. Rules, Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 29(a), DR 2-101(B) (Supp. 1976). The Arizona bar's rules were substantially similar to th
ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility standards in effect at that time. The ABA
Model Code provided, in relevant part, that "'a lawyer shall not prepare or use public media in
order to attract law clients." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (1977) (re-
placed by Model Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983), reprinted in House of
1084
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Bates holding invalidated comprehensive bans on lawyer advertising
but left unsettled the scope of permissible regulation. While the Bates
Court found attorneys' price advertising to be protected speech under
the first amendment, 3 it also stated that false and misleading advertis-
ing could be prohibited.4 The majority expressly declined to consider
the problems of advertising claims relating to the quality of legal
services.5
Delegates Adopts Advertising D.R. and Endorses a Package of Grand Jury Reforms, 63 A.B.A. J.
1234, 1236-37 (1977) [hereinafter House of Delegates Adopts]. The Model Code's advertising
provisions continued a tradition of ABA bans on advertising begun with the ABA Canons of
Profexsional Ethics Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in 33 A.B.A. Rep. 566, 582 (1908). The Arizona
Supreme Court upheld the proscription of Bates & O'Steen's advertisements, see In re Bates, 113
Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), but the United States Supreme Court reversed, Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Court held that no adequate state interest was served by a
total prohibition on lawyer advertising, id. at 363-84; as a result, the ban constituted an
unconstitutional infringement on the public's first amendment right to information about legal
services, id.
Prior to the twentieth century, lawyer advertising was generally considered acceptable. For
example, the Alabama State Bar Association's Code of Ethics, upon which the ABA Canons of
Ethics were based, see :33 A.B.A. Rep. 566, 569 (1908) (reprinting letter from Committee on
Code of Professional Ethics acknowledging debt to Alabama Code of Ethics), expressly permitted
print adiertising. See Ala. St. B. Ass'n, Code of Ethics Rule 16 (1899) (discussing newspaper
advertising), reprinted in H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 356 (1953). But cf. ABA Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics Canon 27 (1908) (suggesting that solicitation of legal business by advertising is
unprofessional), reprinted in 33 A.B.A. Rep. 566, 582 (1908). Even prominent attorneys adver-
tised. For example, David Hoffman, author of several legal treatises and texts, placed newspaper
advertisements containing testimonial endorsements from the United States Secretary of State
Edward Livingston, the President of the Bank of the United States Nicholas Biddle, and Chief
Justice John Marshall. See Daily Nat'l Intelligencer, July 11, 1835, at 4, col. 2. Hoffman was
considered a leader in the field of professional ethics, having devoted an entire chapter to
"professional deportment" in one of his books. See D. Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 720-75
(2d ed. Baltimore 1836) (1st ed. Baltimore 1817). The chapter included a section entitled -Fifty
Re~olutions in Regard to Professional Deportment," id. at 752-75, perhaps the earliest code of
ethics for American lawyers and certainly one of the most influential. See H. Drinker, supra, at
338-51 (reprinting Hoffman's "'Fifty Resolutions" in its entirety). In 1838, future president
Abraharm Lincoln advertised his law practice. See L. Andrews, Birth of a Salesman: Lawyer
Advertiing and Solicitation 1 (1980). In short, lawyer advertising has not been entirely unac-
ceptable throughout the nation's history. Cf. Winona Republican, Dec. 4, 1855, at 3, col. 2.
(advertisement by future Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court), cited in J. Eckland,
Judge Wilson and the Winona & St. Peter Railroad: A Minnesota Drama of the Interaction
Betwen Law and Private Enterprise, 1857-1881, at 10-11 (1979) (unpublished undergraduate
thesis) (available at College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota).
433 U.S. at 367-84.
Id. at 383. Since Bates, the Court has provided further guidance on the extent to which
lawyver advertising is protected under the first amendment. In the recent case of In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191 (1982), the Court held unconstitutional a Missouri rule regulating the categories of
information that a lawyer could include in an advertisement. The Court stated: "Because the
liting published by the appellant has not been shown to be misleading, and because the Advisory
Committee suggests no substantial interest promoted by the restriction, we conclude that this
portion of rule 4 is an invalid restriction on speech as applied to appellant's advertisements." Id.
at 205.
' Bate);, 433 U.S. at 366, 383. The Court noted that the question as to the validity of
quality-related advertising claims was not before it, but that "[s]uch claims . . . might well be
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The organized bar's reaction to Bates has been hesitant and
inconsistent. Two years after the decision, fifteen states still had not
formulated new advertising standards. 6 Although by the middle of
1982 bar associations in all states and in the District of Columbia had
adopted rules allowing some promotional activities by lawyers, 7 many
of these new rules permit only print advertising of the name, address,
and specialization of an attorney, 8 and thus may be incompatible with
the potentially broader scope of the Bates holding. 9 In response to
Bates, the ABA revised the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
to permit limited advertising of the type specifically at issue in the
case: simple publication by print or radio. It concurrently rejected a
proposal that would have allowed all advertising that was not "false,
fraudulent, and misleading." 10 Subsequently, the ABA Commission
deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false." Id. at 366. The majority also exprtesly
declined to resolve "the problems associated with in-person solicitation of clients ... by attor-
neys or their agents." Id. The rules governing in-person solicitation have been developed by thv
Court in later cases. Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (permitting in-person offer, of
free legal assistance when such offers are a form of political expression or association) xwith
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding disciplinary action against
attorney for in-person solicitation for attorney's own personal gain).
6 See S. Cox, W. Canby & A. Deserpa, Legal Service Pricing and Advertising 17-21 (1979)
(presentirig table comparing state bar association lawyer advertising rules in 1977) (unp~ibliihcd
paper) (on file at New York University Law Review) [hereinafter Pricing and Ad\ ertisinz.
7 See Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808, SOS (19s2).
See Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on Lawyer Advertising: SouR'
Practical, Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 Okla. L. Rev. 509, 555 (1978) (noting that, uinder
post-Bateg Oklahoma rules permitting only newspaper advertisements of fex er than 10 squarc
inches with no graphic illustrations, the very advertisement approved by the Supreme Court in
Bates would be illegal). Many states have similar regulations. Several state bar aNociatin,
continue to oppose radio and television advertising by law% ers, and some place added rcquirc-
ments on electronic media advertising. See Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 17-21. For
an extensive analysis of state rules, see L. Andrews, supra note 2, at 135-46. A thoughtfula rd
comprehensive discussion of the constitutionality of state advertising regulations can be fouind in
Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 Am. B. Found. Research J. ! fi7
(suggesting unconstitutionality of many state regulations).
' The basis of the Bates holding was that the flow of "truthful ad crtising concerning the
availability and terms of routine legal services to the public could not be restrained'" 433 U.S. at
384. The majority opinion also discussed four kinds of limitations on lawx er ad% ertiNin( that th
holding was not meant to foreclose: restraints on false, deceptive, or misleading ad% vrtising, id.
at 383; reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising, id. at 3S4,
regulations on advertising concerning transactions that are themselves illegal, id.: and the
"'special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media," id. It is unclear whcther the
new state bar association rules disallow information protected by the Court', "free flov (d
commercial information" approach. See id. at 365.
lu See House of Delegates Adopts, supra note 2, at 1235-37; see also Brosnahan & Andrvew ',
Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In the Public Interest?, 46 Brooklyn L. Rex. 423, 434 (l%13).
In 1978, the ABA House of Delegates amended its 1977 resolution specifically to allow tkevision
advertising by attorneys. See TV Advertising Wins ABA Approval by Wide Margin, 64 A.B.A. J.
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on the Evaluation of Professional Standards, 1 which was charged
with revising the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, recom-
mended the less restrictive rule to the ABA, which adopted it on
August 2, 1983.12 It is as yet unclear to what extent state bar associa-
tions will follow the ABA's lead on the advertising issue.'
3
The discussion of the appropriate regulation of advertising echoes
the debate about whether advertising should be allowed at all. This
Article argues that participants in the debate on lawyer advertising
have failed to appreciate that legal services are a market commodity.
The Article applies basic market and economic theory to the produc-
tion and consumption of legal services and demonstrates that lawyer
advertising offers important advantages to consumers of legal services.
Part I reviews the current debate about lawyer advertising and identi-
fies two incorrect assumptions in the debate that reflect a failure to
view legal services as a market commodity. Part II examines three
different ways consumers acquire information about legal services and
makes some preliminary generalizations about the role of advertising
in providing information to legal consumers. In Part III, the Article
examines advertising's effect on the legal services market, suggesting
that this effect depends on its interaction with other market forces.
Part IV elaborates on the observations made in Part III and argues
that advertising will have a beneficial effect on the market for stan-
dardizable legal services, while having little effect on the market for
individualized legal services. The Article concludes by offering possi-
ble explanations for the current opposition to lawyer advertising.
1341 (1978). The 1977 resolution had permitted only radio advertising. See Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (1977), reprinted in House of Delegates Adopts, supra note
2, at 1235-36.
" This commission is sometimes referred to as the 'Kutak Commission," in reference to its
late chairman, Robert J. Kutak.
12 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that a lawyer may advertise in the
public media provided that he does not make a false or misleading communication and that the
lawyer keep a full copy or record of the advertisement for two years after its last dissemination
along with a record of when and where it was used. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rules 7.1, 7.2 (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 24 (Aug. 16, 1983).
13 As this Article went to press, New Jersey was the only state that had drafted proposals for
new lawyer advertising rules in response to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's provisions
on advertising. The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Attorney Advertising recom-
mended the adoption of advertising rules that substantially resemble the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 7.2. See Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Attorney
Advertising, N.J.L.J., May 5, 1983, at 19-21 (supp.). The New Jersey Supreme Court has yet to
act on these proposals.
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I
LEGAL SERVICES AS A MARKET COMMODITY
The current debate 14 on lawyer advertising fails to recognize that
legal services are a market commodity. Opponents of lawyer advertis-
ing charge that it is inherently misleading and that even literally
truthful advertising will enable unscrupulous and incompetent law-
yers to recruit clients. Without advertising, they argue, prospective
clients must rely on lawyers' reputations, a source that opponents feel
is a more reliable index of professional ability. Hence, the argument
runs, the prohibition on advertising confines consumer information to
the only channel-reputation-that assures consumers will retain
lawyers who are competent. Even truthful advertising, they believe,
will lead clients to accept advertising claims without closely evaluat-
ing them.
Opponents also contend that advertising will raise prices for legal
services. A lawyer who advertises, they argue, must spend more on
overhead for his practice and therefore must charge more to his
clients. Similarly, increases in the cost of practicing law will raise
barriers to entry into practice, thereby decreasing competition and
further increasing the price of legal services. Opponents also believe
that advertising will undermine respect for the legal profession. They
associate it with unprofessional behavior and assert that it will de-
grade lawyers in their own minds and in the eyes of the public.
Supporters of advertising15 argue that advertising will lower
prices with few ill effects. Advertising, supporters contend, will in-
14 Disagreement within the legal profession about the desirability of lawv er ad% ertiqing ha\
continued well after the Bateg decision. See Advertising Still Laying an Egg, 65 A B.A. J. 1014,
1017 (1979) (presenting survey results showing substantial disagreement within the legal proftN-
sion about the effects of lawyer advertising). Examples of the arguments against pcrmitting
broader use of lawyer advertising can be found in Bates, 433 U.S. at 366-79; Jeffers. Institutv -m
Advertising Within the Legal Profession-Con, 29 Okla. L. Rev. 620 (1976): Kindrcgan,
Where Are We Going with Lawyer Advertising?, 62o Mass. L.Q. 41 (1977): Stamper, RinmarkN at
Panel on Advertising, 49 Okla. B. Ass'n J. 459 (1978); Troutman, It Pays to Advertise?, 51 Fla.
B.J. 487 (1977); Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession's Duty to NMakc Ltgal
Counsel Available, 81 Yale L.J. 1181, 1183-85 (1972).
Examples of arguments in favor of broader use of lav. ver advertising can be found in Bat,.
433 U.S. at 366-79; L. Andrews, supra note 2, at 77-84, Atkins, Adertising i. Coming, 51 Fla.
B.J. 191 (1977): DeMent, Legal Services Dilemma: View from the Market, Trial. Aug. 1976i, at
26, 30; Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13
Willamette L.J. 221 (1977); Margolis, Human Rights Commentator, 52 Conn. B.J. 61. 72-71
(1978); Morrison, Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profession-Pro, 29 Okla. L. Rcv.
609 (1976); Note, supra, at 1187-91.
" See note 14 supra.
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duce lawyers to compete in offering lower prices for legal services.
They further assert that advertising will provide consumers with accu-
rate additional information beyond that obtainable through reputa-
tion. Hence, advertising will permit consumers to make more in-
formed decisions about when to use a lawyer and about which lawyer
to use. As for public esteem of the legal profession, supporters of
advertising contend that it will remain undiminished and may in fact
be enhanced by advertising. Finally, supporters argue that the price
competition fostered by the dissemination of information through
advertising will lower the cost of some legal services and will thereby
help satisfy some currently unmet needs for such legal services among
middle income persons.
Both proponents and opponents of advertising have failed to
recognize fully that legal services are a market commodity. The com-
mentators have thus rarely evaluated lawyer advertising in relation to
other market phenomena. This failure to view legal services as a
market commodity has engendered two mistaken assumptions in the
lawyer advertising debate: that advertising will have a similar effect
on all legal services, and that production and consumption in the legal
services market are static. This Part will evaluate each mistaken as-
sumption in turn.
Most commentators have assumed that all legal services are simi-
lar and thus have failed to recognize that advertising's impact,
whether favorable or unfavorable, will not be the same for all legal
services. ' 6 The debate on lawyer advertising presupposes that, if legal
services could be categorized, complexity would be the only relevant
I Some authors, however, have noted that differences among firms' clients would cause
advertising to affect legal practices in varying ways. See, e.g., Note, supra note 14, at 1201-08
(dividing firms between those that serve corporations and wealthy individuals, and those that
serve persons of moderate means). Others have predicted that advertising will have different
impacts on the profession because of the different types of legal services that firms provide. See,
e.g., Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 83-85 (dividing firms between those that provide
"'routine" services and those that provide "complex" services). Commentators have not, however,
distinguished in detail between specially tailored legal services and those that may be systema-
tized, nor have they recognized that private law firms may be divided into three, rather than
two, types. For a description of the three major types of law firms-those that provide individu-
alized services, those that provide standardizable services, and those that provide mixed serv-
ices-see text accompanying notes 53-83 infra. Commentators have neither examined the mixed
practices nor recognized that the three types of private practice are best identified on the basis of
both services and clients rather than by either factor alone. See id. This Article will limit itself to
a discussion of private practices. In general, the Article's analysis will not consider the impact of
services provided by government, legal aid, and public interest lawyers. The Article will,
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determinant. Participants in this debate start from the premise that
even a petty controversy can be complex,' 7 and implicitly conclude
that individualized legal services are always preferable.
We believe that this analysis overlooks important considerations
and think that legal services can be regarded as of two types: those
that can be satisfactorily standardized, and those that require individ-
ualized treatment. We call these two categories "standardizable"' 8
services and "individualized"' 0 services, respectively. Conceivably,
many individualized services could be delivered in standardized ways,
while many routine services could be provided in an individualized
manner.2 0 Whether a legal service is individualized or standardizable
depends primarily on the degree of risk that the particular legal
problem poses for the client. In this context, risk is a function of (1)
the gravity of the consequences to life, liberty, or property that might
ensue if the legal service does not favorably resolve the matter in
question, and (2) the probability that one or more of these conse-
quences will actually occur. 21 Individualized legal services are most
responsive to situations that involve a relatively high risk for the client
and that therefore require direct and sophisticated involvement by an
attorney.2 2 Conversely, standardizable services are most responsive to
however, discuss the impact that the government, legal aid, and public interest bars can ha% e on
the lawyer advertising debate. See notes 101-05 and accompanying text infra.
17 See sources cited in note 14 supra.
is The standardizable category includes both those legal services actually delivered through a
standardized system and those that could be so delivered. For an explanation of standardizable
services, see text accompanying notes 20-23 infra. For purposes of this Article, the term "stand-
ardized" refers to those services that are in fact provided through use of a standardized , ,tem,
19 While the term "individualizable' would yield semantic and analytic s% mmetr%. .% v have
refrained from using it because of its awkwardness, and because contemporary legal services arc
in fact overwhelmingly provided by individualized delivery.
20 Furthermore, any particular legal service is rarely provided through either compltelh
standardized or individualized techniques. For instance, all attornexs at least ue intra-office
forms based on their past work. Similarly, many components of even a unique, complex, high-
risk legal service, such as document discovery and retrieval in an antitrust suit, can be routinized.
Some lawyers prefer an individualized approach, while others seek as much standardization as
possible. See text accompanying notes 54-64 infra.
21 While legal services should not be categorized solely on the basis of the complexity of the
legal problem, see text accompanying notes 23-24 infra, complexity can be an important factor
in calculating risk; complexity generally increases the probability that routinization a ill lead to
adverse consequences.
22 Almost all litigation, complex business transactions, and tax matters fit into this category.
See text accompanying note 56 infra.
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relatively routine situations that involve low risk to the client and that
therefore require comparatively little direct attorney participation.2 3
Using complexity as the sole or primary determinant of legal
services categorization is thus inappropriate. A complex legal matter
does not necessarily require elaborate legal services when there is a
low probability that serious adverse consequences will result if routine
handling of the matter permits a mistake to be made. While a petty
matter can be legally complex, not all legally complex matters involve
substantial risk.2 It would be absurd, for example, to enlist costly
legal services for a controversy in small claims court or for the testa-
mentary planning of a tax-exempt estate. Conversely, an inherently
simple legal matter, such as borrowing $150,000,000 to erect a build-
ing, is worth individualized legal services where serious, adverse con-
sequences could result from only a minor error. From the consumer's
viewpoint, therefore, risk is the more relevant variable in determining
the value of legal services and thus in choosing the appropriate type of
legal services. The differing nature of legal services reflects the differ-
ing nature of consumers' needs for these services.
Because participants in the advertising debate have failed to
recognize that legal services are delivered in a market, they have also
presupposed that both production and consumption of legal services
are static. For instance, opponents of lawyer advertising assume that,
because legal services are a necessity, advertising will stimulate de-
mand only by encouraging frivolous, ill-spirited litigation. 2 This view
fails to recognize, however, that, as legal services become more affor-
"' Most noncomplex, uncontested matters, such as a will for a small estate, an uncontested
divorce for a marriage with little common property, or a title transfer for a small asset, fall into
this category. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra. Standardized production techniques are
ordinarily appropriate where stakes are small.
", See note 21 supra.
21 See H. Drinker, supra note 2, at 212 ("extensive advertising would doubtless increase
litigation," contrary to public policy). Criticism of lawyer advertising often results from a more
general criticism of the level and fundamental nature of litigation. See Francis & Johnson, supra
note 14, at 223; Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48, 68, 72 (1935)
(observing that view of litigation as evil per se existed even as long ago as the advent of
Christianity). Regardless of community opposition, litigation started to become more common-
place in America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See P. Miller, Life of the
Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War 186 (1965) ("[D]emocratic Americans
were preternaturally ready to sue each other in courts of law, especially in the primitive turmoil
of settlement across the Alleghenies."); W. Nelson, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth
County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825, at 122-32 (1981) (breakdown of religious homogeneity
within Plymouth County was one factor contributing to increased use of courts for dispute
resolution).
Furthermore, it is somewhat disingenuous to criticize lawyer advertising because it might
increase the volume and character of litigation. While there is some suggestion that permitting
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dable, middle and low income consumers who currently do not pur-
chase necessary legal servicesM 26 will be able to purchase such services.
Moreover, to consumers in general, the choice of using legal services
ordinarily is a relative preference. As in other aspects of economic life,
consumers assess the costs and benefits of purchasing a legal service in
light of the specific problems before them, their resources, and their
desires for goods and services of other types. Consumers will purchase
legal assistance when they believe that the transaction produces
greater benefits than can be obtained by purchasing other goods or
services at that price.2 7
Recognition of the interdependence of supply and demand is
essential to understanding the effect of advertising on the legal services
lawyer advertising has increased certain forms of litigation, see N.Y. Times, Apr. I1, 19)S3. at
DI, col. 1 (describing successful use of television advertisements by personal injury lawoyers), it i-
far from clear what form the increase will ultimately take. In addition, these arguably negative
effects must be weighed against the benefits stemming from increased law. er advertising.
Finally, hostility towards particular causes of action, such as personal injury suits, is more
properly directed at the relevant substantive law. Cf. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monster and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 Har'. L. Rev. 664, 66S-76
(1979) (arguing that critics of class actions should not confound the impact of proceduiral rulu
with the impact of changes in substantive law). Seeking to discourage particular causes of action
by restricting advertising serves only to limit such suits to plaintiffs who are aware of available
legal services. Cf. B. Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means 142-46 (1970) ("[TJhc
practical effect of the old belief about the evil nature of all litigation was to limit the use of th.
litigative mechanism to the strong, the wealthy, and the knowledgeable.").
It is not easy to define when legal services are truly necessary. See B. ChristenseU. \u1pra
note 25, at 18-20 (discussing subjective nature of legal need). The argument that lo% income
consumers do not purchase legal services, however, does not depend on an particular definition,
of legal need; current statistics can be used to support this proposition independcntly of an
particular definition of legal need. A national study published by the American Bar Foundationi
examined the relationship between the incidence of problems that arguabl% required 1. ,al
services and the frequency with which services were actually used. See B. Curran, The Lcal
Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 260-61 (1977). The tiud% deniw-
strated that, over the full range of legal problems, there is significant latent demand for l.tl
services: Lawyers are consulted for only about a third of the problems that could rcason.ably be
called legal problems. Id. The study also examined the relationship between the incidence of
arguably legal problems, resort to legal services, and discretionary income. See id. at 152-57
(presenting tables analyzing impact of income on patterns of lavoer use). In man Nituation\.
poor individuals who had experienced arguably legal problems were less like to ,ck IU aMI
services than similarly situated individuals with higher income. Id. This observation iN not
surprising because poor people often fail to recognize the legal dimensions ,f the probl1w1
confronting them, see B. Christensen, supra note 25, at 18-26, or because they simpl bclirc
that, given their income, legal services are not worth the cost, see Project. An A.N mtcnt of
Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services. 90 Yale L.J. 122, 132-35 (19S,1)
(describing theory that cost-benefit analysis determines patterns of lav yer use).
'7 See R. Dorfman, Prices and Markets 107-16 (3d ed. 1978) (discussing utilit 3 niaximiza-
tion); P. Samuelson, Economics 436-47 (10th ed. 1976) (general discussion of substitiltion ftfect).
The concept of substitution is implicit in the theory of price elasticity of demand. Svc gencrally
R. Dorfman, supra, at 21-23 (discussing demand curve); P. Kotler, Marketing Manaviiivnt:
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market. The demand for legal services is elastic. For example, if the
price of legal services decreases, other factors remaining the same, the
inclination to purchase them will increase. Similarly, supply is elastic
in the legal services market. For instance, if the demand for legal
services increases, suppliers will have more incentive to provide addi-
tional volume. This interdependence can be illustrated through exam-
ple. If several law firms begin to advertise, demand for their legal
services will increase, encouraging these firms to provide more serv-
ices. As additional volume is produced, the supplier's cost of providing
legal services may decline because fixed costs in the production process
can be distributed over more units of service. These firms can achieve
economies of scale through specialization, work force composition
(e.g., the use of paralegals), or altering clients' expectations about the
degree of personalized service to be provided. They can also structure
their practices so as to focus on early diagnosis of risk-which can
ordinarily be estimated very quickly by ascertaining the stakes in-
volved in the matter 28-and to process low risk and high risk matters
differently. This reduction in average costs in turn makes it possible to
cut prices and to stimulate still additional demand. The additional
demand will give producers incentive to increase the supply of legal
services. Thus, opponents and supporters of advertising have not fully
recognized that advertising, by enabling the dynamics of normal mar-
ket forces to operate on the delivery of legal services, may alter
methods of supplying, as well as delivering, legal services. 29
Failure to recognize that advertising will affect the way legal
services are delivered has distorted the profession's analysis of advertis-
ing's impact on the practice of law. This Part's brief examination of
the demand for and the production of legal services suggests that the
process of delivering legal services must be regarded as being subject
to market forces. The remainder of this Article will elaborate on the
nature of this market by examining in greater detail how legal services
Analysis, Planning, and Control 156-65, 398-401 (4th ed. 1980) (presenting model of consumer
purchase decisions and discussing price elasticity of demand); P. Samuelson, supra, at 59-61
(discussing demand curve). In general, consumer access to information about particular goods
and services varies both within and between markets, a situation that may make comparison of
marginal benefits difficult. For a detailed discussion of the difficulties posed by imperfect
product information in general, see H. Beales, R. Craswell & S. Salop, The Efficient Regulation
of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & Econ. 491 (1981).
See note 23 and text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
Under some circumstances, a radical drop in price, a radical rise in volume, a radical drop
in cost, and a radical increase in purchases may occur more or less simultaneously. This is the
phenomenon of transformation from manual or hand-tailored production and distribution to
mass production and distribution.
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are delivered and the role that advertising plays in their delivery. The
next Part will begin this elaboration by analyzing the different ways
that consumers acquire information about legal services.
II
THE ROLE OF ADVERTISING IN THE LEGAL SERVICES MARKET
Individuals seeking to purchase legal services rely on the same
sources of information that consumers rely on in other markets: per-
sonal knowledge, reputation, and advertising. It is essential to recog-
nize that advertising is rarely, if ever, the only source of information
about products and prices. 30 This Part will examine how these sources
affect consumer decisions in the legal services market. 31
The first and probably strongest source of consumer information
is personal knowledge about a product. 32 Personal experience enables
a consumer to evaluate a good or service on the basis of that experi-
ence and to appraise it in light of his own preferences. The shorteom-
30 Personalized communication is often more important to consumer buying decisions. See E.
Katz & P. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass
Communications 48-65 (1955) (suggesting that personal communication is more influential than
impersonal communication, especially when a product is expensive, risky, or purchased infre-
quently); P. Kotler, supra note 27, at 484 (noting that communication between people has major
role in consumer buying decisions). Katz and Lazarsfeld found primary group reference vital to
interpersonal communication. They suggested that information is relayed and enforced through
informal networks of communication. See E. Katz & P. Lazarsfeld, supra, at 48-65. Secondary
group references, such as employment and community associations, have also been found
important. See Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360 (1973). One study
found that personal communication may be important in the decision of whether to use profes-
sional services: "Talk is apparently almost a prerequisite for going to a psychotherapist, for 80 to
90 percent [of those who see psychotherapists] have talked with others [about the problem]." C.
Kadushin, Why People Go to Psychiatrists 312 (1969). With regard to legal senices in particular,
see K. Fisher & C. Ivie, Franchising Justice: The Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services
Program and Traditional Legal Aid 14-17 (American Bar Foundation Series, Legal Services for
the Poor 1971) (suggesting that, in spite of free legal services offices' increased use of mass media,
reputation information is the most important source of information about free legal services); ef.
Hudec & Trebilcock, Lawyer Advertising and the Supply of Information in the Market for Legal
Services, 20 U.W. Ont. L. Rev. 53, 59-66 (1982) (noting that most Canadian consumers lack
requisite personal knowledge to shop comparatively and wisely for legal services).
31 Information, in turn, is only one of three factors controlling market transactionm. The
three factors-product design, market segmentation, and information dissemination-are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 52-83 infra.
' See D. Hawkins, K. Coney & R. Best, Consumer Behavior: Implications for Marketing
Strategy 412 (1980) (recognizing the importance of personal experience to consumer dccision ,
but conceding its effect is hard to measure); F. Nicosia, Advertising, Management, and SociOty:
A Business Point of View 284 (1974) (suggesting importance of personal experience in consumer
decisions).
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ing of personal knowledge, however, is its particularity. Even exten-
sive personal experience with a specific product, such as the services of
a particular lawyer or firm, will not provide the consumer with all the
information he needs to make the best market decision. Making the
best market decision requires not only knowledge of an individual
product but also an ability to compare it with other available prod-
ucts.
In order to make an informed decision about purchasing legal
services, a consumer must be familiar with the legal services provided
by a wide range of lawyers or firms. Comparing products through
personal knowledge requires a significant investment of time, effort,
and money. Relatively few consumers can afford the repeated experi-
ence necessary to make an informed choice among legal service pro-
viders. A field study published by the American Bar Foundation
shows that, at least in the present market for legal services, the aver-
age adult uses a lawyer once or twice in his life. 33 Only a very small
percentage of adults uses a lawyer as often as five times,3 4 but even
five uses of legal services would constitute very limited experience
compared with, for example, the average person's use of doctors,
dentists, or automobile mechanics. Furthermore, even if a consumer
has used a particular legal service with relative frequency, he is still
unlikely to have had the direct experience necessary to compare it
with the services of other firms or with possible substitutes for legal
services. 35
As a partial result of the general insufficiency of personal knowl-
edge, a second source of information-reputation-becomes an im-
portant element of consumer decisions to purchase legal services. 36
Reputation provides the potential buyer with a form of personal
knowledge as it has been accumulated by others. Reputation informa-
13 B. Curran, supra note 26, at 185-86, 190 (68% of survey respondents had used a lawyer
one or two times).
11 Id. at 190 (seven percent of survey respondents had used a lawyer five times or more).
3 Examples of some possible substitutes for legal services are arbitration performed by non-
lawyers, use of contracts adapted from do-it-yourself manuals, and obtaining tax advice from a
nonlawyer.
3, Reputation information and personal influence can be assumed to affect legal services
purchases much as they do purchases of other goods. Cf. E. Katz & P. Lazarsfeld, supra note 30,
at 219-33 (discussing flow of information and influence for grocery buying, fashion trends,
movie-going, and public affairs; though each area had different "opinion leaders," breadth of
information flow and importance of reputation were present in all areas). But cf. Pricing and
Advertising, supra note 6, at 4-9 (information about legal services less widespread than informa-
tion about most products; the disparity results, in part, from extensive ban on lawyer advertis-
ing).
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tion is important to consumers for two reasons. First, reputations are
seen as trustworthy because they come from such reliable sources as
family and friends.3 7 Second, the acquisition of reputation informa-
tion requires relatively small investments of time and energy. Oppo-
nents of legal services advertising implicitly assert that reputation is a
very reliable medium of information. 8 Nevertheless, the evaluations
that create a reputation are not those of the prospective purchaser
himself. Hence, the prospective purchaser will find reputation infor-
mation both less complete and less trustworthy than his personal
knowledge.3 9 Whenever possible, he will seek to confirm reputation
information with personal knowledge or will at least try to verify the
reputation's accuracy.40
Because some consumers have much greater access than others to
reputation information, not all prospective purchasers of legal services
are equally well equipped to verify reputation information. For exam-
ple, one valuable source of reputation information, personal contact
with a lawyer or with those who frequently use legal services, is
concentrated most heavily among whites and property owners with
high incomes and better education.4 1 Thus, nonwhites and persons of
low and middle socioeconomic status usually have fewer sources of
reputation information about legal services.
A third source of product information is advertising. Advertising
consists of a message, usually short, that is relayed to a large group at
the instance of the producer. Like reputation information, advertising
allows consumers to compare goods or services without having re-
37 See E. Katz & P. Lazarsfeld, supra note 30, at 139-46, 325 (suggesting that individuals are
more likely to be influenced by people they consider competent and trustworthy); ef. P. Lazars-
feld, B. Berelson & H. Gaudet, The People's Choice 60-64, 155-57 (3d ed. 1968) (arguing that
pressure from family and friends has strong influence on decisions about whether to vote and for
whom to vote); Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1981, § 2, at 29, col. 1 (discussing role of "word of mouth"
in consumer decisions).
3' See H. Drinker, supra note 2, at 218 ("Clients naturally gravitate to a lawyer who has
successfully represented their friends or who has obtained the confidence of the community by
effective public service.").
3 See Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 30, at 64.
40 Consumer information searches rarely end after hearing a single piece of reputation
information. Consumers are likely to engage in a sufficiently lengthy information search so as to
be able to compare and evaluate any particular piece of information. See P. Kotler, supra note
27, at 156-67 (describing information searches).
41 Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contacts, 34 Am. Soc. Rev. 309, 312-
15 (1969); see also Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. Rev.
381, 426-27 (1965) (lower class individuals are less likely to know someone who can refer them to
lawyers); Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 30, at 64-65 (maintaining that individuals in lower
socioeconomic groups are less likely to know a lawyer socially); Project, supra note 26, at 144-45,
164 (presenting statistical results of a national survey about patterns of lawyer use).
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peated, broad-based personal experience. 42 It enables them to gather,
at little personal cost, information about a range of goods or services-
information that may be indispensable for substantiated market com-
parisons and choices. 43 Advertising has a number of characteristics
that make its impact relatively ineffectual in comparison with either
direct experience or reputation information. The brevity of its mes-
sage constrains producers from communicating all of the information
consumers need or desire. Because the advertising information comes
from an impersonal source, consumers often pay little or no attention
to it. Similarly, the obviously biased source of the message encourages
them to seek corroboration through other available reputation infor-
mation. 44
Advertising has advantages and disadvantages for producers as
well. Before deciding to advertise, any individual producer must care-
" Many commentators are skeptical of the degree to which consumers trust advertising
messages unless the impression created by the message is reinforced by good reputation or
satisfactory experience with the product. They suggest that advertising is only one factor affect-
ing consumer preferences. See, e.g., Huth, The Advertising Industry-An Unlikely Monopolizer,
19 Antitrust Bull. 653, 666-68, 672 (1974); Miller, Advertising and Competition: Some Neglected
Aspects, 17 Antitrust Bull. 467 (1972); see also note 37 supra. Others, however, believe that
consumers are very susceptible to advertising messages. They fear that the best advertisers would
capture unduly large segments of the market. See, e.g., Kaldor, The Economic Aspects of
Advertising, 18 Rev. Econ. Stud. 1 (1950-1951). An introduction to some of the arguments
concerning advertising can be found in F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 376-84 (2d ed. 1980), and H. Beales, R. Craswell & S. Salop, supra note 27, at 491-
539. For examples of these arguments in the context of professional services, see C. Baird,
Advertising by Professionals (Int'l Inst. for Econ. Research Original Paper No. 8, 1977) (suggest-
ing that advertising increases competition); Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 4-9 (con-
sumer ignorance of legal matters is so great that attorneys may gain greater market control than
most other producers or service providers).
The experience of law firms that have advertised suggests that advertising has not yet
overcome direct experience as a marketing factor and that it stimulates primarily latent demand
for legal services by encouraging only those who have not previously consulted a lawyer to do so.
See ABA Commission on Advertising, Summary of Hearing Testimony (1979) (clinic proprietors
suggest that most of their clients had not previously consulted a lawyer); see also Hudec &
Trebilcock, supra note 30, at 70 n.45. Significantly, advertising designed to reach previously
untapped markets has succeeded for both brokers and tax preparers. See Karp, Leader of the
Herd, Barron's, Dec. 16, 1974, at 10; Karp, The Bewilderment of Henry Block, Dun's, Sept.
1974, at 53, 57 (the 50% annual growth of H & R Block derived from lower and middle income
persons who had not previously sought tax preparation aid); A Broker Uses TV to Educate
Clients, Bus. Wk., Apr. 11, 1977, at 90.
11 Some kinds of information that can be reliably communicated through advertising, see
note 44 infra, can be critical to prospective consumers of legal services. Examples of such kinds of
information are (1) the fact that legal services can help remedy a specific problem, and (2) the
price of legal services.
11 See notes 49-50 and accompanying text infra. As one economist has observed: "[T]he
amount of deceptiveness in advertising can easily be exaggerated if one simply looks at the
incentives of advertisers to deceive without considering the incentives of consumers not to be
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fully weigh these costs and benefits. Advertising's primary advantage
is that it enables the producer to reach and recruit a large number of
consumers and thereby to increase revenue; the increased volume may
permit the reduction of production costs through economies of scale4 '
and thereby generate further increases in profits. Advertising, how-
ever, also has drawbacks for the producer. Its chief drawback is its
high cost; 46 moreover, efficacy normally requires repetition. 47 Adver-
tising also incurs the costs associated with mass marketing, such as
those of preparing for levels of production sufficient to meet the
demand generated by advertising promotion. This increased demand
may also require some form of standardized production, both to
absorb marketing costs and to increase output, and standardized pro-
duction entails start-up costs such as expenditures for research and
development. 48 Thus, restrictions on advertising limit lawyers' expo-
sure to entrepreneurial risk. If lawyers cannot advertise, and legal
services are promoted through personal knowledge and reputation
information, lawyers will not bear any of the direct costs of providing
consumers with information. Furthermore, because without advertis-
deceived. Deception requires not only a misleading or untrue statement, but someone ready
to be misled by the statement," Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729, 741)
(1974) [hereinafter Nelson, Advertising as Information].
One factor that affects consumers' confidence in advertising information-i.e., their suscep-
tibility to being deceived-is the content of the advertising message. Consumers behave differ-
ently towards advertising of "search qualities"-qualities that can be determined by inspecti n
prior to purchase-than towards advertising of "experience qualities"-those qualities that
cannot be ascertained prior to purchase. Cf. id. at 731 (defining "search" and "'experience"
qualities). Producers have strong disincentives to mislead consumers about search qualities
because consumers can easily verify assertions about search qualities prior to purchase. Id.
Consumers can therefore have confidence in search information that is provided by advertising.
Id. Market forces do not, however, provide producers with similar disincentives against mislead-
ing consumers about experience qualities. Thus, when experience qualities are important to
making a purchase decision, consumers will tend to rely on reputation information rather than
on advertising information. See Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ.
311, 321-23 (1970) [hereinafter Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior].
Two other factors tend to reduce consumer reliance on advertising. The more e'pens ic a
good is, the more likely the consumer is to rely on reputation rather than on adwurtiing
information. Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra, at 749. Second, consumers tend to rely
more on reputation information when buying products that are infrequently purchased. See
Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, supra, at 321-23 (suggesting that conruntr.s will
rely more on reputation when evaluating seldom-purchased goods).
45 See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
" See L. Andrews, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing advertising expenditures by law,' firms).
47 See C. Dirksen, A. Kroeger & F. Nicosia, Advertising Principles, Problems, and Cases 87-
89 (5th ed. 1977); D. Lucas & S. Britt, Measuring Advertising Effectiveness 218 (1963).
48 Designing methods for processing a high volume of cases requires a large investment of
time and money. For example, one legal clinic devoted more than a year's time and several
hundred thousand dollars to creating computerized legal forms before opening its first office.
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ing demand is relatively stable, lawyers will lack incentives to incur
the set-up costs associated with mass production.
Because advertising may fail to alter consumer choice, the pro-
ducer who advertises is subject to considerable entrepreneurial risk. If
he spends a great deal of money and fails to gain the consumers'
attention, he has lost much. More importantly, if he spends much, but
consumers are dissatisfied with his product, he will lose more than his
promotional investment. The producer who advertises runs this risk of
extraordinary loss because of the general effect that advertising has on
consumer behavior. Advertising tends to cause consumers to seek
information about the producer's reputation and about other con-
sumers' direct experience with him.49 Moreover, advertising often
better enables consumers to evaluate reputation information.50 If rep-
utation and experience information are unfavorable, advertising can
have the ironic effect of informing a much larger group of consumers
about the poor quality of the producer's goods or services. Thus, while
advertising offers the potential of attracting a high volume of business,
it also carries with it the possibility of a significant loss of business. 5'
This Part has discussed the relative efficacy of the three different
means of informing consumers about legal products and has outlined
the effects of lawyer advertising in general terms. It has suggested that
effective advertising requires a large investment, must be accompa-
Interview with Wayne Willis, senior partner and co-founder of Hyatt Legal Services, in New
Haven, Connecticut (March 5, 1979); see also Brill, TV Pitchman for Cut-Rate Legal Advice,
Esquire, May 9, 1978, at 87, 89-90; Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 30, at 82, 89.
"' Advertising can often cause consumers to feel a need for a product. Once a consumer's
perceived need for a product has reached a sufficient level, the consumer will initiate an
information search. The nature of this information search varies with product categories and
with the consumer's personal characteristics. In general, however, noncommercial information
sources such as reputation have a stronger effect on consumer evaluations of products than have
commercial information sources. See P. Kotler, supra note 27, at 156-57; cf. P. Lazarsfeld, B.
Berelon & H. Gaudet, supra note 37, at 75-86 (political propaganda arouses citizen interest in
politics, causing citizens to acquire information on their own initiative).
"' Advertising plays a different role in the consumer's decisionmaking process when it is seen
after the consumer has already reached a level of perceived need sufficient to have begun an
information search. When the consumer is exposed to advertising at this stage, it helps the
consumer to remember brand names and thus enhances the consumer's ability to remember,
distinguish, and evaluate reputation information. See Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra
note 44, at 734.
" Cf. Hudec & Trebilcock, supra note 30, at 71 (dishonest advertising will in large part
create its own demise); Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising,
8 J. Legal Stud. 527, 530 (1979) (advertising, when combined with a good reputation, creates a
positive brand recognition that contributes to a firm's value; misrepresentation, on the other
hand, is likely to diminish a firm's value).
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nied by the capacity for mass production of quality goods or services,
and must avoid negative feedback. Only if consumers judge the prod-
uct as satisfactory will the producer find advertising worthwhile.
From the consumers' perspective, advertising by competitors provides
information about many products. It thus affords consumers a basis
for comparing many products, even though the basis of that compari-
son is less reliable than that provided by personal knowledge or repu-
tation. The next Part will focus more specifically on the role of adver-
tising in the legal services market.
III
THE EFFECT OF MARKET FORCES ON THE UTILITY OF LAWYER
ADVERTISING
Exchanges between producers and consumers generally depend
on three factors: product design, market segmentation, and informa-
tion dissemination. 2 "Product design" encompasses both the particu-
lar nature of a product, as well as its price to the buyer. "Market
segmentation" refers to a product's characteristic features and their
effects on the preferences of consumers willing to purchase the general
type of product. "Information dissemination," discussed in Part II,
involves both the methods that producers use to provide consumers
with information about their products and the methods that con-
sumers use to obtain information. This Part will consider how adver-
tising, as one form of information dissemination, varies in its utility to
lawyers and consumers depending on the other factors affecting the
sale of legal services-product design, market segmentation, and
other forms of information dissemination.5 3
A. Product Design
The "product" provided by lawyers consists of a wide variety of
services ranging from the preparation of a simple will to the litigation
of a complex matter. We believe that legal services can be separated
into two categories: standardizable services and individualized serv-
ices. Standardizable and individualized services differ in two respects.
5' Although commentators have not used these particular terms to describe a markct, the
concepts are implicit in the literature of economics and marketing. See, e.g, C. Dirk'tn, A.
Kroeger & F. Nicosia, supra note 47, at 66-96; R. Dorfman, supra note 27, at 7, 13-41; P. Kotlur.
supra note 27, at 129-69, 194-206, 395, P. Samuelson, supra note 27. at 45-48.
" See note 27 supra; cf. Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 4-9 (applying conventional
market theory to the legal services market, but noting several distinctions in that market).
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First, the two kinds of services use different production techniques.
The second difference, largely a function of the first, is that the fees
charged for standardizable services reflect underlying costs different
from those reflected in individualized service fees.
Standardizable services include matters such as uncontested di-
vorces, simple wills, and routine collection litigation, each of which is
best delivered through a routinized system of production. 54 The use of
a routinized system of production requires legal services producers to
apply analytical skills to designing routines for processing similar legal
problems. Although creating these standardized systems requires ex-
tensive up-front research, the production system allows lawyers to
handle more clients and to achieve lower per unit costs. 5 5 When
standardized production is used, the client's bill reflects both the
underlying costs of processing that particular legal problem and a
portion of the capital cost incurred in creating the production system.
Standardizable services thus have potentially lower per unit costs
because of the economies of scale that can result from relatively higher
production volume.
Examples of individualized services, in contrast, include a plan
for a vast estate involving many beneficiaries, a large securities issue, a
merger of two substantial business corporations, and a trial involving
a serious tort or crime. When a firm provides an individualized serv-
ice, the legal problem is resolved solely through the application of
skills to that particular case; individualized service production does
not utilize formal, standardized production routines. Fees for individ-
ualized legal services principally reflect the costs of the efforts applied
to that particular problem.56
Every law practice operates through some combination of indi-
vidualized and standardized production.5 7 In general, however, legal
practices fall within one of three categories: primarily individualized,
"4 Standardizable services are best delivered through a routinized system of production
because delivery through such systems can lower price without reducing quality. See text
accompanying notes 27-29 supra and 55-56, 84-94 infra. If more extensive use of lawyer
advertising is permitted, thus allowing market forces to operate more freely, standardizable
senrice will tend to be provided through standardized production systems.
" See MurLs & McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The
Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 Am. B. Found. Research J. 179, 191-93 (discussing standardization
of legal services).
" While billing for contingent fee services differs from that accompanying most other
individualized services, contingent fee services are properly included in the individualized cate-
gory because they often involve individualized discovery and proof. However, the procedures for
conducting some contingent matters, such as workers' compensation proceedings, can be readily
standardized.
"I The terms "standardized" and "standardizable" are discussed in note 18 supra.
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primarily standardizable, or mixed. 5 Primarily individualized prac-
tices deliver most of their services through individualized production
and incur most of their costs and earn their profits on a case-by-case
basis. Firms providing primarily standardizable59 services employ a
different production strategy. They assume a high volume of client
matters60 and focus their labor on systematizing their response to
similar legal issues. The costs of creating this system can be recovered
gradually through billings for cases subsequently resolved through the
standardized production system.
Individualized and standardizable practices differ in the kinds of
demand they require to make a profit. Primarily individualized prac-
tices can profit with a small or moderate volume of cases. Indeed, a
single large case can sustain a fair-sized firm for whatever time is
required to resolve the matter.6' In contrast, to attract clients, firms
with primarily standardizable practices must charge less than those
with individualized practices because they provide clients with less
personal attention, a characteristic that is generally regarded as a
valuable incident of professional services. 62 Consequently, producers
1 It is important to emphasize that placement in any one of these categories is a matter of
degree. Primarily individualized firms may utilize methods of production and cost recovery that
are characteristic of primarily standardizable firms, and vice versa. This phenomenon can be
illustrated by examining some of the features of a typical primarily individualized practice, (he
corporate law firm. Such firms have developed routine procedures for organizing a corporation
that are standardized down to the minutes that are taken at the first meeting of incorporator.,
Furthermore, they also treat some of their costs as capital expenditures and reco er thtm
gradually over time. For instance, corporate law firms often discount the hourly billing* -d
junior associates. This initial "loss" is then recouped by the billing rates charged once tho~o
associates have accumulated sufficient professional experience.
-" For purposes of the ensuing discussion, it will be assumed that firms offering standardiz-
able services in fact use standardized production techniques. See note 54 supra. Some Cnum-ncr,
of standardizable services, however, may still choose to patronize primarily individualized firmN
that use primarily individualized production. See notes 18 supra and 70 infra.
"0 Attempting to attract and preparing to accommodate higher demand are not undertakcn
without risk. See text accompanying notes 45-51 supra.
The legal problems normally facing businesses, whether involving litigation or such ron-
litigation matters as arranging mergers or issuing securities, are usually quite coMpl,±'. Ths
stakes involved in these problems are high enough to justify the large expenditures that nornall.
accompany individualized legal services. The complexity of business problems normally rcjurc,
extensive attention by individual attorneys to insure that legal advice is specially tailorcd to the
individual problem. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text infra. Furthermore, the clients wh,
have such legal needs once are likely to have them many times. A few of ths c clients can
therefore sustain a firm for years.
1z If the standardizable firm does not substantially undersell individualized or mixud firiij'
consumers, being infrequent and often apprehensive purchasers of legal services. ,N ill cithtr
patronize the individualized or mixed firm, where they awill receih e more reassurin pcrraa)
attention, or they will refrain from using a lawyer altogether. Firms that provide Ntandardizablc
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of standardizable services will profit less from each case. To make
their practice worthwhile, then, they must attract a high volume of
cases.
Mixed practices, as the term implies, contain elements of both
individualized and standardizable practices. They tend to offer a wide
range of legal services to a varied clientele and produce their services
through both individualized and standardized production systems.
The manner in which mixed firms recover their costs also distinguishes
them from either primarily individualized or primarily standardizable
firms. Mixed firms cannot maximize profits on services delivered
through either individualized or standardized production.6 3 Because
they spend less time processing individualized matters than do indi-
vidualized firms, they are less efficient in resolving individualized
problems. This inefficiency is likely to result in their charging smaller
profit margins in the fees they collect for individualized services.
Similarly, mixed firms are less efficient in providing services through
standardized production than are primarily standardizable firms since
mixed firms never achieve the economies of scale achieved by stan-
dardizable firms. Since their costs of production are therefore higher,
they profit by charging more for each case. They may also offer to sell
standardizable services at or below cost in hopes of attracting future
individualized business.64
B. Market Segmentation
Another aspect of the legal services market is its segmentation.6
Market segmentation refers to the phenomenon that various categories
of purchasers will buy different types of product images. For the
seller, it means that specific categories of potential purchasers must be
identified and that the product must be patterned to address their
specific needs.
services, then, must advertise price. While in theory advertising that does not mention price
might attract latent demand, in practice this is unlikely to be true. Most individuals probably
already know of the general availability of legal services for common problems such as wills,
divorces, real estate, and personal injuries; they fail to contact lawyers because of perceptions
about the high price of legal ser'ices.
"I In theory, nothing would prevent a firm from separately providing standardized and
individualized services, thus creating a hybrid that attains the efficiencies of both individualized
and standardizable firms. Such a firm would not be a mixed service firm as we have defined it.
" Cf. Lochner, The No Fee and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 431, 443-44 (1975) (young lawyers take on pro bono cases to attract future paying clients, to
gain experience, and to make legal contacts).
", See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra and 73-79 infra.
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In the model legal services market, the consumer chooses a type
of product according to his financial resources and the risks in-
volved. 6  Those with great resources and more at stake favor individu-
alized services; typical individualized service clients are wealthy indi-
viduals and corporations whose legal problems usually are both
complex and risky.6 7 Consumers with substantial interests at stake are
willing to pay a higher fee to avoid the perceived risks that attend a
more standardized service.6
The great majority of the public, however, has moderate re-
sources and has legal problems of moderate risks. These consumers
usually face problems such as wills, divorces, and property acquisi-
tions that involve small or moderate risks of loss. 6A9 The stakes involved
are, on the average, less than for consumers seeking individualized
services. While most consumers' legal problems are not necessarily
simple, from the consumers' viewpoint they are worth only a modest
investment in legal services.70 Currently, consumers with modest
problems patronize mixed or standardizable firms; they apparently do
not feel, given their resources and preferences, that primarily individ-
ualized service is worth the cost.
C. Information Dissemination
Information dissemination constitutes the third aspect of market
behavior. As might be expected, each of the three types of practices
has, by virtue of its product and market, different strategies for dis-
seminating information about itself. Consequently, each relies on a
different mix of the information techniques discussed in Part II-
direct experience, reputation, and advertising.7'
" See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
'7 While complexity can be an important factor in determining whether individualized
services are appropriate, legal problems are better categorized by risk than by complexity. See
note 21 and text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
O Individualized services are arguably of better quality than services provided through
standardized production because individualized services present less risk that the service wvill not
be tailored to respond to the unique facts of a legal problem.
" B. Curran, supra note 26, at 103-04.
70 Some standardizable services may nevertheless be provided in an individualized fashion.
For example, a large Wall Street firm may handle divorce, probate, estate planning, or traffic
ticket problems for a wealthy person. Firms providing primarily standardizable services, hovL -
ever, will have little capacity to provide individualized services and thus must charge relatively
lower fees to attract middle income clients.
71 See text accompanying notes 30-51 supra.
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Providers of primarily individualized services have little use for
advertising of any kind and no use for mass advertising. 72 Because
purchasers of individualized legal services have a great deal at stake, 73
they are likely to evaluate carefully information about legal services.
Advertising provides little information useful to such consumers. Its
brevity renders it relatively ineffective in communicating the com-
plexity, reliability, and uniqueness of an individualized service. Fur-
thermore, advertising originates from an obviously biased source.
Simply put, advertising is not cost effective for the seller of individual-
ized services because it cannot communicate information likely to
influence potential purchasers of those services.
Other factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of individualized
legal services advertising. Many individualized services clients are
repeat users of legal services74 and accordingly have personal knowl-
edge of particular firms' past work. Similarly, clients with sophisti-
cated legal problems, business or personal, usually associate with
other persons having similar legal problems.75 Reputation information
about individualized firms, therefore, is often available to the client
with a need for individualized services. The availability of alternative
reliable information sources makes advertising largely irrelevant to
patrons of individualized firms.7 6
Firms offering primarily standardizable services, however, must
appeal to a broader-based, less well-connected, and less well-in-
formed clientele to generate the volume of business necessary to profit
from their moderate prices. 77 To generate this large client pool, these
practices must stimulate the latent demand for legal services. They
72 See Note, supra note 14, at 1201-04 (concluding that individualized service providers have
little use for advertising, but not considering differences in production techniques used to provide
individualized and standardizable services).
13 "Stake," in this context, is the gravity of the consequence to life, liberty, or property that
might ensue if a legal service does not favorably resolve the matter in question. See text
accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
14 See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95, 103-04, 112-19 (1974).
7' See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
Advertising expenditures would largely be wasted for the individualized firm, as almost
any advertising medium will reach beyond the small group of persons requiring individualized
legal care. Primarily individualized firms, however, can perhaps benefit from the advice of
public relations firms. See Brill, How to Handle the Press, Am. Law., Jan. 1981, at 8; Goldstein,
Marketing Lawyers' Services into the 1980's, 54 N.Y. St. B.J. 202, 236-39 (1982).
" Primarily standardizable firms must charge moderate prices because they are likely to use
standardized production techniques. See note 59 supra. Because standardized production pro-
vides the consumer with less personal attention, and personal attention is generally regarded as a
valuable incident of professional services, market forces will encourage standardizable service
firms to charge less for standardizable services than would an individualized firm.
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must reach those persons who, because of the relative infrequency of
their legal problems, the high cost of legal services, or the mystique
surrounding the legal profession, do not consult attorneys for any but
the most pressing problems. 78 For the potential client, even the mini-
mal information that advertising provides about a primarily standard-
izable practice is useful. Standardizable service firms must provide
consumers with this threshold of information;7 9 personal knowledge
and reputation cannot reach such a wide audience efficiently.A0
Mixed practices,8' unlike standardizable and individualized serv-
ice firms, do not rely on any single marketing strategy. The firm
providing mixed services can make use of all three forms of informa-
tion dissemination, depending on the mix of legal services it provides.
While a mixed services firm could advertise its standardizable serv-
ices, it will not find advertising as profitable as will a firm providing
primarily standardizable services. 82 Mixed firms cannot achieve econ-
omies of scale comparable to those achieved by primarily standardiz-
able firms because mixed firms cannot accommodate mass demand for
78 This conclusion can be inferred from statistics showing that poor people who had experi-
enced problems that could reasonably be called legal problems were far less likely to seek legal
services than were similarly situated individuals with higher incomes. See B. Curran, supra note
26, at 152-57 (presenting tables analyzing the impact of income on patterns of lawyer us); see
also note 26 supra.
79 Cf. L. Andrews, supra note 2, at 13 (noting advantages of legal advertising); Heffernan, A
Lawyer Learns of Broadcasting's Advantages, Broadcasting, Nov. 13, 1978, at 18 (describing
how advertising helped one legal clinic achieve needed volume); Meyers, Legal Clinics: Their
Theory and How They Work, 52 L.A.B.J. 106 (1976) (arguing that without advertising legal
clinics are unlikely to flourish); Muris & McChesney, supra note 55, at 183-84, 189-91 (observing
that clinics must advertise to achieve volume of work sufficient to prosper).
The growth of legal clinics since advertising by lawyers has been permitted, see notes 2-13
and accompanying text supra, suggests that standardizable firms need to advertise. In 1974,
there were eight legal clinics in the nation. In early 1977, there were more than 60 such law
firms. In early 1979, after many state bar associations had changed their advertising rules to
conform with Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), there were more than 150 legal
clinics. See Bodine, Legal Clinics: The Bargain Bar, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 12, 1979, at 1, col. I
[hereinafter Bodine, The Bargain Bar]. By late 1979. nearly 700 clinics existed. See Bodine,
Proliferation of Legal Clinics Continues; 550 More Were Born in the Last 10 Months, Nat'l L.J.,
Dec. 31, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
80 See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra. As noted above, see notes 49-51 and accompany-
ing text supra, personal knowledge and reputation are still vital to the success of primarily
standardizable firms. The generality of information contained in advertisements, as well as
skepticism about advertising claims, will lead potential clients to supplement advertising with
information from reputation and personal knowledge. Consequently, clients in need of standard-
izable services will avoid standardizable firms that have bad reputations or with which they have
had bad experiences.
" For a description of mixed service firms, see text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
13 Firms providing primarily standardizable services are likely to use standardized produc-
tion techniques. See note 59 supra; see also notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.
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standardizable services. Thus, other things being equal, a mixed serv-
ices firm cannot match the low prices that standardizable services
firms charge.8 3 For a mixed firm, investment in advertising is corre-
spondingly less profitable.
Similarly, while reputation and personal knowledge will attract
clients for individualized services offered by mixed practices, these
forms of information dissemination will often be less effective media
for these firms than for firms concentrating on individualized prac-
tices; clients of mixed services firms typically are less frequent users of
legal services than are clients of individualized practices. At the same
time, though, clients of mixed practices usually have less at risk and
demand less personalized treatment. As a result, skillful advertising
might succeed in recruiting some individualized clients for mixed
firms.
IV
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADVERTISING FOR THE LEGAL SERVICES MARKIT
As we have seen, permitting lawyers to advertise probably will
have little effect on the market for individualized legal services: 4 The
price and quality of such services are likely to remain largely as they
are today. s5 Yet advertising can improve the function of the market
- A comparison of mixed and standardizable firms' fees suggests that mixed practices have
bhen unabl, to achieve economies of scale. The legal advertisements that have proliferated since
Batc ha% e generally promoted competition and overall local price reduction. Telephone inter-
view with X1. Canby, Professor of Law, Arizona State University (Feb. 12, 1979); see Clark, A
Client's-E~u View of Low-Fee Lawyers' Ads, Money, Mar. 1978, at 117. Average clinic prices
are significantly lower than those of traditional, mixed practice law offices serving persons with
average legal problem,. Bodine, The Bargain Bar, supra note 79, at 27-28. Economic theory,
which predicts cost-saving through planned high-volume routine legal practice, thus appears
%,indicated. See Hirshleifer, The Firms Cost Function: A Successful Reconstruction?, 35 J. Bus.
235, 239-40 (1962); Muris & McChesney, supra note 55, at 184.
, See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
Major firms with business clients appear to have steadily increased their hourly billing
rates and starting associates' salaries in the years since Bat-s. See Tisher, Bernabei & Green,
Cleaning Up, Student Law., Nov. 1977, at 14, 16; see also annual salary surveys in Student
Law., Nov. 1982, at 21-24; Student Law., Nov. 1981, at 25, 28-31; Student Law., Nov. 1980, at
-35, 38, 41-43; Student Law., Nov. 1979, at 21, 24-28; Student Law., Nov. 1978, at 27, 30-35;
Student Law., Nov. 1977, at 19, 21, 44-46; Student Law., Oct. 1976, at 26-28; Student Law.,
Oct. 1975, at 22, 24. The surveys show that the largest increases, in both absolute dollars and
percentage terms, have been at the largest firms, which, not coincidentally, are individualized
firms serxving primarily business clients. See also Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 76-77
(presenting tables comparing the fees charged for four basic legal services: uncontested divorce,
simple will, will with trust, and uncontested bankruptcy). Generally, firms that advertise and
charge a flat rate have the lowest prices. Firms that do not advertise and that charge by the hour
presumably provide more individualized services. They also appear to charge the highest fees.
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for standardizable services and will probably lead to lower prices
without a decline in the quality of services. Current restrictions on
advertising interfere with the optimal function of the market for
standardizable legal services. Without advertising, producers cannot
generate high volumes or achieve economies of scale, and thus have
little incentive to offer standardizable services at lower prices. Indeed,
prohibitions on advertising may actually inflate the price of standard-
izable services. Consumers of such services cannot readily compare
prices without advertising 6 so that services actually provided through
standardized techniques may appear no different to the infrequent
user than do individualized services. Therefore, lawyers who provide
standardizable services can use standardized production techniques,
charge fees far above cost, and still attract clients.
Historically, the quality of legal services has been uneven and
regulated, if at all, by the bar. Lawyers' codes of professional respon-
sibility insure only a minimum standard of quality and are enforced
infrequently at best. 7 In the legal services market, as in most other
markets, consumer protection is left primarily to market forces.
Market forces control quality when consumers refuse to make
repeat purchases from a producer and give that producer a bad repu-
tation by informing other consumers about the low quality of its goods
and services. These market safeguards operate fairly effectively for
primarily individualized services because many individualized con-
sumers are frequent users and also know one another.S Without
advertising, however, market forces cannot protect consumers of
mixed and standardizable services, who are infrequent users and who
know few persons acquainted with a particular firm. In a legal serv-
ices market without advertising, frequent users are more likely to
receive services at the price and quality they desire than are consumers
with less access to experience and reputation information. 9 Without
advertising, the quality and price of standardizable legal services are
controlled principally by producers.
" See Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 5-6.
87 See Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 Am. B. Found.
Research J. 919, 922-23, 1000 (arguing that clients have the primary responsibility for identify-
ing lawyer deviance and that lack of awareness about the disciplinary s stern minimizes the
reporting of questionable lawyer behavior). Furthermore, the bars' -al1-but-exclusive focus on
deviance control" seeks only to identify the worst offenders rather than to upgrade the Overall
quality of the profession. Id. at 1015.
s See text accompanying note 41 supra.
, See Pricing and Advertising, supra note 6, at 5-6 (noting that consumers of legal ser'ice,
are often unable to evaluate fully the quality of services and fairness of the price).
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As we have seen, lawyer advertising will not affect the price and
quality of individualized services. 90 Providers of individualized serv-
ices are not likely to advertise, and consumers of individualized serv-
ices are not likely to rely on advertising information. Permitting ad-
vertising will thus neither facilitate nor interfere with the operation of
the market for individualized legal services. On the other hand, ad-
vertising will enable producers of standardizable services to increase
business volume, to achieve economies of scale, and to lower prices.
Once consumers are able to compare prices of standardizable services,
those firms that can mass produce these services will attract more
clients. 9' Consequently, some producers of standardizable services
will grow larger, and market power in this part of the legal services
market will become more centralized. 92
Advertising will also tend to improve the quality of standardiz-
able legal services by improving information dissemination in the
market in two ways. First, advertising will create greater familiarity
with names of firms, making it easier for consumers to retain informa-
tion they hear about a particular firm . 3 Second, advertising will
improve access to reputation information by stimulating latent de-
mand. Individuals who could not, or who believed they could not,
afford legal services will find that legal services are affordable. These
individuals will then purchase legal services, evaluate the services they
purchase, and supply reputation information to other consumers.
Thus, because of greater name familiarity and improved access to
reputation information, consumer evaluations of quality-especially
negative evaluations-are likely to become known to potential cus-
tomers of these firms. With this information, consumers will avoid
bad firms and will patronize the better ones. 4 For the consumer of
standardizable services, the probable result of permitting lawyers to
advertise will be lower priced services of better quality.
See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
"' Factors such as quality, location, office facilities, friendliness, and community standing
will continue to be important to consumers. Nevertheless, consumers will presumably look first
to lower-priced practices when quality and other attributes of competing standardizable firms
are largely indistinguishable.
12 A study of eyeglass sales, for example, found that states permitting advertising have a
greater proportion of large, low-priced retail outlets in major population centers and fewer
small, "neighborhood" optometrists' offices. See Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price
of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & Econ. 337, 350-51 (1972).
See Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra note 44, at 734.
This observation highlights deficiencies in the traditional argument against lawyer adver-
tising. Traditionalists maintain that reputation information alone is the best mechanism for
steering consumers away from incompetent practitioners. These traditionalists wish to limit
severely lawyer advertising so as to enhance the impact of reputation on market behavior.
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V
EXPLAINING THE OPPOSITION TO LAWYER ADVERTISING
If advertising by attorneys is beneficial for consumers of stan-
dardizable services, why has the bar resisted it? The most obvious
explanations reflect the structure of economic and political interests
within the bar.
Mixed practices profit by charging inflated fees for standardiz-
able services or, alternatively, by using standardizable services as loss
leaders to attract individualized service businessY5 Advertising would
permit growth of primarily standardizable firms, and these firms
would then begin to compete for clients who would otherwise patron-
ize mixed service firms. As a result, mixed service practitioners would
like to prevent advertising. Because mixed service practitioners proba-
bly constitute a majority of current legal service producers, and be-
cause they have correspondingly great power in the organized bar and
in the political system at large,9 these practitioners have presented an
influential opposition to lawyer advertising.
At least until recently, the power of mixed practice attorneys was
enhanced by their tacit alliance with attorneys supplying primarily
individualized services, a group that has traditionally dominated the
leadership of the bar.97 Lacking the numerical strength to achieve
leadership without cooperation, individualized practitioners achieved
power in the bar by maintaining a confraternity within the profes-
sion, in part by cultivating the support of mixed practitioners." They
9- See text accompanying note 64 supra.
96 The majority of the nation's attorneys practice alone or in small firms, earning far les than
their colleagues in large firms. Although most lawyers are officially classed as "urban residcnts,"'
many of these practice in county seat towns or suburban neighborhoods rather than *doan-
town." See Q. Johnstone & D. Hopson, Jr., Lawyers and Their Work: An Analysis of the Lkr14al
Profession in the United States and England 17-18 (1967); A. Nichols, The Pricing of Physician
and Lawyer Services 57-59 (1975) (unpublished dissertation). See generally Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1977 Census of Selected Service Industries: Legal Services. at
5-46 to -47 (presenting table of demographic characteristics of American legal profession) [herv-
inafter 1977 Census].
The organized bar reflects these divisions. A prominent attorney has noted that, w ith
certain exceptions, " 'state bar association members tend to be trial lawyers. They tend to be
from small firms, they tend to represent nonurban areas, and they're pretty conservative.' "
Welles, The Growing Split in the ABA Between 'Retail' and Corporate Lawyers, Am. Law.,
Aug. 11, 1978, at 33 (preview issue) (quoting the late New York attorney Francis T.P. Plimpton).
97 See J. Auerbach, Unequal Justice 62-65 (1976); cf. Woytash, Who Speaks for the Legal
Profession?, 64 A.B.A. J. 24 (1978) (noting that the bar once had a "grand consensus").
98 One observer has written:
The bar may never have been a monolith as it appears in retrospect, but it is certairil
not one now. Perhaps it was mere acquiesence that gave authority to whatever pronounce.
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generally did not challenge mixed practitioners' opposition to adver-
tising.99
Bar politics, however, have changed since the Second World
War. 100 A third faction, the public interest bar,'0 ' has developed.10 2
Public interest lawyers favor advertising, which they believe will
provide middle income individuals with greater access to legal serv-
ices.""3 Perhaps as importantly, the practice of law has become more
specialized; fewer law firms offer a variety of services ranging from
matters such as uncontested divorces and personal bankruptcies to
antitrust litigation.10 4 Mixed practice lawyers are therefore a less nu-
merous and less powerful faction in the bar. In the advertising debate,
ments the leadership made about what was good for lawyers or was good for the public.
But whatever it was, the process has changed.
Woytah, supra note 97, at 24.
" One commentor has noted that "[e]ven the more ardent professionalists [i.e., individual-
ized practitioners] who have dominated the ABA's top leadership, have been no match for the
protectionists [i.e., mixed practitioners] who not only outnumber them but fight much harder
because they have a lot of business to lose" if liberalized advertising rules and other reforms, such
as no-fault insurance and expanded prepaid insurance plans, were to be enacted. Welles, supra
note 96, at 33. "Despite [its] economic insulation [from the effects of progressive reform], the
corporate bar has not been a very loud voice for progressive views. ... Id.
I, See Slovak, Influence and Issues in the Legal Community: The Role of the Legal Elite,
1981 Am. B. Found. Research J. 141, 158-63 (observing that, while legal elite has leadership
positions in Chicago bar, it frequently cannot control the bar's resolution of issues); Woytash,
supra note 97, at 24 (suggesting that contemporary legal elite shares little with average lawyer
and that this gap is gaining in importance and impact).
'"'I For purposes of this Article, the term "'public interest bar" is used in the broadest sense and
includes government and legal aid lawyers.
I-' See Erlanger, Young Lawyers and Work in the Public Interest, 1978 Am. B. Found.
Research J. 83, 85-87 (in 1961, only one percent of graduating law students began careers in
public interest law, compared with 12% in 1971-1972). The rise of the public interest bar is also
reflected in the number of well-known organizations, such as the Natural Resources Defense
Council, Common Cause, and Public Citizen, that began in the 1970's. See J. Handler, E.
Hollingsworth & H. Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights 69, 70-75 (1978)
(observing that public interest firms expanded in the 1970's, adding to the existing base of public-
oriented legal groups such as the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and government
supported legal aid services). Furthermore, during the 1960's, law students identified increas-
ingly with government and the public interest bar rather than with corporate law firms. See J.
Auerbach, supra note 97, at 278-79.
'" See, e.g., Freedman, Advertising and Soliciting, in Verdicts on Lawyers 94 (R. Nader &
M. Green eds. 1976); Morrison, supra note 14.
I'l Statistics compiled by the Bureau of the Census indicate that sole practitioners tend to be
less specialized than partnerships. See 1977 Census, supra note 96, at 5-46 to -47 (24.6% of sole
practitioners are specialists; 44.2% of partnerships are specialized). Furthermore, sole practi-
tioners have become a relatively smaller percentage of the legal profession in recent years. See
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, at 416
(1975). Another study, which focused on the Chicago bar, concluded that lawyers' fields of
practice depend on their clients' needs. See Laumann & Heinz, The Organization of Lawyers
Work: Size, Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law, 1979 Am. B. Found. Research J.
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many elements of the individualized practice bar have joined forces
with the public interest bar.105 Thus, changes in bar politics make the
passage of rules permitting broader use of lawyer advertising far more
likely than in the past.
If the advertising problem were only one of economic competi-
tion within the bar, however, it might not have generated such heated
controversy. One must look deeper, even if only to speculate. Perhaps
the underlying anxiety about advertising stems from its tendency to
portray legal services as a "business" rather than a "'profession." Of
course, the practice of law manifestly is both a profession and a
business, 10 6 and a highly competitive business at that. Why the passion
to deny its character as a business? The answer derives from the
notion, basic to our legal ideals, that justice cannot be sold. 1 7 This
notion is central to the ideology of the bar. A group for which that
notion is so important inevitably would find it difficult to recognize
that access to justice is in any sense a question of buying and selling.
Nevertheless, lawyers differ in skill, knowledge, and the time they can
devote to a case, and individuals with more resources are usually able
to purchase both a superior lawyer and more of his time. Therefore,
justice-actual outcomes in the legal system-is related to the quality
of lawyering that a client can afford; justice at the margin can often
be bought.
The legal profession is understandably reticent to acknowledge
this tension between ideal and reality. One means of avoiding the
217, 233-37. The study noted that this phenomenon has the potential of creating increased
conflicts within the bar that parallel conflicts among lawyers' clients. See id. at 238-45.
105 According to one government attorney, the public interest bar views the ABA " 'less as a
trade association than as a professional society devoted to enhancing the profession's contribution
to society.' "Welles, supra note 96, at 33 (quoting Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.).
One partner in an individualized firm has suggested that opinions about proposed reforms
reflect personal interest:
"I'm very troubled by the high cost of legal services .... I think legal advertising is a great
thing-provided it's done with dignity. I think fee competition is fine, prepaid legal
services are great if they work, and no-fault is overdue. I'm for reform in residential real
estate, probate, all that stuff . .. [.] That's because our firm is not really economically
dependent on serving the individual."
Id. at 33 (quoting Washington, D.C., attorney Richard Phillips).
106 Cf. Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Social Structure of Large Law
Firms, 1981 Am. B. Found. Research J. 97 (discussing the effect of market forces on the structure
and growth of large law firms).
107 According to Dean Roscoe Pound, the lawyer should act "not as a hired seeker for what he
is told to find by his superiors, but as a free seeker for the truth for its own sake, impelled by the
spirit of public service inculcated by his profession." R. Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to
Modern Times 362 (1953). Black's Law Dictionary 776 (5th ed. 1976) defines "justice" as the
"constant and perpetual disposition of legal matters or disputes to render every man his due."
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unpleasant implications of this tension is to minimize overt participa-
tion by lawyers in activities, such as advertising, that suggest that
effective legal assistance is bought and sold. 8 Opposition to legal
advertising, in other words, is a consequence of the inconsistency
between providing legal services through the free market and realizing
equal justice before the law.'0
Analysis of the legal services market, however, suggests that ad-
vertising will not increase the degree to which justice is actually
bought and sold. The services best suited to advertising are standard-
izable and involve simple, low risk, often uncontested situations. The
explicit sale of these services will not affect the sale of other, more
sophisticated services on which the result of a high risk legal contest
most likely depends. Thus, increased use of lawyer advertising can
help lead to significant improvements in the function of the market for
legal services without threatening the ideal that justice cannot be
sold." 0 To fulfill its professional duties to the public and the legal
system, the bar should permit broader use of advertising by lawyers.
IS As described by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, "[t]he most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct." ABA Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in 33 A.B.A. Rep. 566, 582 (1908).
1-" Dean Pound, in a widely quoted passage, noted that "[t]here is much more in a profession
than a traditionally dignified calling. The term refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as
a common calling in the spirit of a public service-no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood." R. Pound, supra note 107, at 5. Some attorneys, however,
had begun to criticize the Pound view of altruistic lawyers even prior to Pound's book. See, e.g.,
Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 Annals 177, 177 (1933) (stating that
large corporate law firms' "main work is in essence the doing of business").
11 This Article has not sought to address the problem of unequal access to sophisticated legal
services in situations where the quality of legal services can be outcome-determinative. That
problem is, of course, another story.
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